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Abstract 
The authors analyzed the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) in a sample of Italian 
manufacturing and service firms and presented standard quantile estimates to investigate 
heterogeneity in pay-performance impacts on labor productivity and wages. In a second 
stage, the endogeneity of PRP was taken into account by using instrumental variable 
quantile regression techniques. They find considerable heterogeneity across the distribution 
of labor productivity and wages, with the highest role of PRP obtained at the lowest and 
highest quantiles. However, for all quantiles, the comparison of productivity and wage 
estimates suggests that PRP might not only be rent-sharing devices, but also incentive 
schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings are confirmed 
for firms under union governance and suggest that well designed policies, that circumvent 
the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement.  
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Introduction 
In the last few years, there has been a trend towards decentralization of wage setting, 
associated with the increasing use of variable pays to provide an important element of 
flexibility and closer links to individual or collective performance. However, this trend has 
shown great variability across EU economies and the number of contributions using 
nationally representative sample surveys to estimate the productivity effects of these 
agreements is still low. Furthermore, econometric studies have mainly focused only on the 
incentive effects of such schemes, whereas the question of whether employees benefit 
financially from performance related pay (PRP) has never been satisfactorily resolved. 
Highlighting the incentive experience in Italy would be particularly worthwhile because 
prior works for this country have been restricted to large companies or selected sectors 
(Origo, 2009). In addition, not only has the efficiency performance been disappointing in the 
Italian economy, but also large drops have been recorded in the share of income accruing to 
salaried employees. We intend to analyze the drivers of this evidence and test whether the 
insufficient room given in decentralized bargaining to PRP has affected the efficiency and 
distributive patterns recorded in Italian enterprises.   
We also focus on a relevant feature: the quality of industrial relations, represented by the 
presence of unions. The impact exerted by unions depends on their influence on promoting 
more efficient management, through their ‘voice’ function, but also on extracting union wage 
premiums, as predicted by monopoly union bargaining models. This seems relevant in a 
highly unionized economy, such as the Italian case, and particularly important because, up to 
now, international evidence shows contradictory findings and the effects of unions on pay 
settings and productivity are still ambiguous. These uncertain results require the attention of 
the researches aimed at verifying the role of workers’ representation in the PRP experience.  
We present OLS estimates but also address the question of the heterogeneity of firms with 
quantile regressions, whereas most studies have estimated PRP bonuses and union wage 
premiums focusing exclusively on conditional mean models. Thus, by adopting quantile 
regression techniques, we examine the heterogeneity of PRP effects over whole productivity 
and wage distributions. Finally, we consider the endogeneity of the firm’s decision to adopt 
PRP, a choice that may depend in part on factors that influence productivity and wages, so 
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that assuming exogeneity of PRP may give biased estimates. Therefore, to gain robustness, 
we have validated quantile results by instrumental variable estimates.  
We use a unique dataset for the Italian economy obtained from the ISFOL Employer and 
Employee Surveys (2005, 2007, 2010) which collect information at firm level for both the 
manufacturing and services sectors and enterprises of all sizes. This rich dataset allows us to 
explore the relationship between PRP and labor productivity (and wages), but also to control 
for an ample set of covariates
1
.  
 
Related literature 
One of the key characteristics of compensation systems concerns fixed or variable 
payments, i.e. payments linked to worker input or to worker performance (Lazear, 1995). The 
properties of these alternative options are still under debate since up to now neither of these 
payment types produces universally superior results (Belfield and Marsden 2003). We offer 
additional evidence by focussing on output- based pay, such as PRP, that may be individual 
or collective.  
Pay settings that change from rewards based on input measures to payments related to 
output outcomes may induce dramatic improvements in production, which may be explained 
by two factors that have equal impacts. The first is that this policy attracts workers of greater 
ability (Lazear, 2000). The second is that contingent contracts are effective in contexts in 
which output (but not effort) is observable by the employer because such contracts encourage 
more effort and mitigate the agency problem (Prendergast, 1999).  
However, controversial aspects arise from the possible trade-off between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations since contingent rewards may conflict with intrinsic motivation, thus 
impairing performance (Benabou and Tirole, 2003). For instance, Bandiera et al. (2010) 
examine the importance of social ties among workers and find positive spill-over effects 
where social ties exist, as a given worker’s productivity is significantly higher when that 
person works together with friends, especially those who are more able. In order to motivate 
workers, firms may, therefore, choose to exploit social incentives as an alternative to 
monetary incentives. 
                                                          
1
The determinants of decentralized bargaining and of the bargaining covering PRP have been estimated 
on the basis of the ISFOL surveys for 2005 and 2007 by Damiani and Ricci (forthcoming). 
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Economic theory is also ambiguous as to the expected impact of PRP in the form of 
collective bonuses on productivity. These bonuses, such as profit sharing, favor better 
teamwork, greater workforce cooperation in facing new technology and organizational 
changes, and these collective incentive schemes are more likely to be offered when total 
output is the result of the efforts of many agents and individual contributions cannot easily be 
identified (Holmstrom, 1979; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1992). In such cases, the absence of group 
incentives may lead to inferior Nash equilibria, associated with low levels of productivity due 
to limited cooperation. By contrast, employees who participate in enterprise results “will 
become more committed to the goals of that enterprise, leading to improvements in 
individual and organizational performance. At a wider societal level, financial participation 
may be seen as a tool for redistribution of income and wealth, and may therefore serve as a 
broader instrument for social integration” (Pendleton et al. 2001, p.1).  
However, collective bonuses may induce employees to free ride on the efforts of others 
and cut productivity. In such circumstances, group incentives may lead to decentralized 
monitoring due to peer pressure and shame norms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992), thus mitigating 
opportunistic behavior. Along these lines, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that workers whose 
efforts may be noticed by their fellows display more cooperative attitudes. Negative 
externalities (which are pervasive in workplaces) are thus internalized, not because of 
altruistic behavior but because peer pressure discourages free-riding, especially when 
workers expect that many future interactions with the same peers will occur.  
The positive productivity effects of collective PRP have been tested in a number of recent 
studies (Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours, 2009; Kruse, Freeman and Blasi, 2010; Kato, Lee 
and Ryu, 2012). What deserve closer attention are the main impacts of PRP on wage setting. 
In decentralized wage bargaining, workers, through PRP, can appropriate a large part of the 
rents generated by their firms. One interpretation of the positive wage premium negotiated in 
firm-level contracts is that of rent sharing. This phenomenon may be relevant when specific 
human capital is important and there is “a match-specific surplus (rent), created by the costs 
of finding new partners, and this surplus will have to be shared by bargaining” (Acemoglu 
and Piscke, 1999, p. F121). By using firm-level data some authors show a robust positive 
association between wages and profitability (see, among others, Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; 
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Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996). This evidence has been confirmed by introducing 
controls for unobserved worker heterogeneities (Gurtzen, 2008; Martins, 2009).  
However, how many of these wage effects are due to the presence of unions is still 
uncertain. It can be argued that trade unions have sufficient bargaining power to obtain high 
wage premiums with firm-level agreements even in the absence of PRP schemes (Booth and 
Frank, 1999). By contrast, it has been found that unionized plants are more likely to utilize 
incentive payments, also accompanied by joint decision-making, that lead to better results in 
terms of firm performance (Black and Lynch, 2001).  
Finally, as signaled by the incentive contract literature, clusters of complementary human 
resource management (HRM) practices may exert significant effects on productivity. Also 
skill improvements and workers’ skill competence, that result in more efficient production, 
can be obtained from specific high performance work practices, especially when adopted in a 
bundled form (see for the Italian case, Leoni, 2012). The set of HRM variables may include 
union relations, as tested in the representative study of Ichniowsky, Shaw and Prennushi 
(1997). Even in low unionized economies, such as the UK, there is new evidence that worker 
representatives are perceived by employers as institutions capable of improving firm 
performance (Bryson and Forth, 2010). This means that in unionized firms, constructive 
institutional responses overcome free rider problems of group incentives, increase workers’ 
commitment and reduce voluntary labor turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 1998).  
We will address these issues in the econometric section. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained by the Employer and Employee 
Surveys (RIL) that were conducted by ISFOL in 2005, 2007 and 2010 on a representative 
sample of partnerships and limited liability firms that operated in the private non-agricultural 
sector.  
The ISFOL-RIL surveys collect a rich set of information about employment composition, 
personnel organization, industrial relations and other workplace characteristics. In particular, 
the RIL questionnaire provides information about the adoption of decentralized bargaining 
and PRP, as well as the presence of unions. Each RIL cross-section for the years 2005, 2007 
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and 2010 counts about 25,000 firms, whereas its longitudinal component over the period 
2005-2007-2010 counts about 12,000 firms. 
Each firm is asked whether or not a PRP scheme has been adopted. Therefore, our PRP-
variable is a dummy variable indicating the existence or not of a PRP scheme of some kind.
2
 
As regards unions, the respondent firm is asked whether there is a form of employee 
representation of any kind in the firm. We thus analyze a sub-sample of unionized firms. 
Dummy variables are also inserted to take into account if firms are controlled by foreign 
companies, if they export, innovate, or have been involved in mergers or acquisitions in the 
three previous years (see the Appendix, Table A1, for detailed definitions of all variables). 
In order to link information concerning workers’ characteristics to indicators of firm 
performance and accounting variables, a sub-sample of the RIL dataset was merged with 
balance-sheet information from the AIDA archives. Then the longitudinal RIL-AIDA merged 
sample was restricted to those limited liability companies which operated in the Italian 
private sector over the period 2005-2010. Furthermore, we excluded firms with less than five 
employees to retain only those firms characterized by a minimum level of organizational 
structure. The final sample amounts to a no-balanced panel of about 9,000 firms during the 
period 2005-2010. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Italy is characterized by a two-tiered bargaining regime, where the first-level wage 
contracts are linked to the target inflation rate and decentralized bargaining should distribute 
wage premiums linked to productivity or firm results. However, the implementation of 
decentralized bargaining has been modest. As shown by Table 1, in 2005, 2007 and 2010, 
only 15%, 12% and 14% of firms, respectively, had decentralized agreements that include 
payments by results, thus confirming the limited spread of these PRP schemes, and no 
significant changes over the observed period. From 2005 to 2010, the number of sample 
firms increased from 8064 to 10136 and, thus, some caution is necessary in interpreting 
summary statistics, although this time variability and the composition effects appear limited. 
                                                          
2
 Unfortunately, we do not know whether the different types of schemes are based on firm-, group- or 
individual- performance (this information is available only for 2010). Furthermore, the dataset does not 
provide statistics on how many workers in the firm receive PRP. 
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The merged RIL AIDA sample also reveals a rather slight increase in the two dependent 
variables (labor productivity and wages), and in the physical capital per employee between 
2005 and 2010. 
With respect to workforce composition, Table 1 shows that the share of blue-collar 
workers increased over time, from 46% in 2005 to 55% in 2010, while, symmetrically, the 
proportion of white collars decreased from 45% in 2005 to 39% in 2010. Concerning the 
percentage of women, workers with fixed-term contracts and immigrants (workers coming 
from other countries), a slight decrease over time was recorded, indicating a tendency, in our 
sampled period, towards the reduction of ‘peripheral’ employment. On average, the 
proportion of women decreased from 39% to 35% from 2005 to 2010; analogously, the stock 
of workers with fixed-term contracts over the total employment declined from 11% in 2005 
to 10% in 2010, and the share of immigrants, on total employees, declined from 9% to 5%.  
The overall weakness in productivity and wage growth of sample firms may be related to 
the decreasing share of innovative and exporting units. Firms that originated new products 
declined from 55% to 45%, whereas the proportion of exporters slumped from 41% to 31%, 
from 2005 to 2010. 
It is worth noting that information on lagged sales volatility, used as instrument for PRP 
(1 when this volatility is higher than the median sample value and 0 otherwise), is available 
only for a restricted sub-sample of firms (about 3,000 observations per year). This means that 
by performing the instrumental variable regressions we made a double robustness check. 
First, we took into account endogeneity and second we performed estimates on a different, 
more restricted sample of firms. 
According to expectations, small-size firms prevail and the largest share of firms is mainly 
located in Northern Italy. In particular, firms with less than 50 employees are more than 80% 
while those with more than 250 employees, in each year considered, are about 5% of the total 
sample. Finally the RIL-AIDA data indicate that firms were mainly specialized in 
manufacturing sectors and less present in services, with the exception of the trade sector.  
These differentials in sector and territorial localization of PRP Italian firms, as well as in 
various characteristics of workforce composition, show the importance of our unique data 
and of its wide coverage. 
[Insert Table 1] 
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Finally, notice that PRP firms, that are not so numerous, exhibited better performances 
and paid higher wages; the Kernel density estimations, calculated on the pooled sample, 
show that there is higher probability to find PRP firms among those with higher values of 
labor productivity and wages. As shown by Figure 1, the distribution referring to PRP firms 
is slightly placed to the right of that concerning other firms. This difference is recorded in the 
whole sample and is confirmed in the restricted sample that includes only unionized firms. 
These first comparisons encouraged us to further explore the existence of possible relations 
between PRP schemes and enterprise performance. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Econometric strategy 
In this section we present the empirical strategy we used to estimate the effect of PRP 
on labor productivity and wages. In particular, the relationship between labor productivity 
and PRP may be formalized by a production function augmented by a dummy variable 
capturing the incidence of PRP and inserting a set of other controls for firm characteristics 
and workforce composition. The following equation was estimated: 
 
(1)   (
 
 
)
   
     (
 
 
)
   
                                                    
 
where   (
 
 
)
   
 is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) 
physical capital per employee, PRP represents a dummy variable indicating the presence of 
PRP and the vector Fit denotes controls for characteristics at firm level and workforce 
composition. The parameter s denotes sector specific fixed effects, j regional 
(NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas,  represents year fixed effects and  is the 
error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labor productivity. 
The wage equation parallels the productivity equation (1). Thus, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 
(2)   (
 
 
)
   
     (
 
 
)
   
                                                    
itL
K






ln
t

it

9 
 
9 
 
 
where the dependent variable represents the (log of) the average annual wages (W) per employee 
(L), while the explanatory variables are the same included in equation (1).  
We started with a pooled cross section analysis of equations (1) and (2), controlling for time 
fixed effects. We preferred a pooled sample because we had an unbalanced panel dataset, with a 
different number of observations for each year. In any case, a pooled OLS estimator does not 
allow us to take into account heterogeneity across firms. For this reason, besides OLS estimates, 
we performed a conditional quantile regression to study the effect of PRP along the labor 
productivity and wage distributions.  
First of all, we started with the classical Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator: 
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where   is the coefficient of interest,   is a vector of coefficients for all control 
variables that now are included in the matrix  ,   is the quantile 0.1; 0.5; 0.9,    is the 
asymmetric loss function   ( )   (   )   | |   (   )  (   )| |. 
As known, the OLS estimator fits a linear model for the dependent variables   (
 
 
) and 
  (
 
 
) by minimizing the expected squared error. The quantile regression (QR) fits a linear 
model for the same dependent variables using the asymmetric loss function   ( ) and 
minimizing the least-absolute deviations. When      , we have the conditional median, 
the loss function is symmetric and this expectation function minimizes the least absolute 
deviations. For   (   )          , the loss function weights positive and negative 
terms, asymmetrically. This means, for example, that if       then much more weight is 
placed on prediction for observations   (
 
 
)                than for observations 
  (
 
 
)               .  
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For labor productivity and wages we estimated three different quantile regressions 
simultaneously, with                  . In addition, we addressed heteroskedasticity by 
means of bootstrap standard errors that assume independence over observations (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009). The QR approach is more robust to outliers and provides information 
about the relationships between PRP and the dependent variables at different points of their 
conditional distribution. 
However, the Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator does not allow us to distinguish 
between casual effects and spurious correlation between PRP and productivity or wages, 
that will typically arise if more productive firms or firms that pay higher wages more likely 
adopt PRP schemes. Thus, if there are unobserved factors influencing the adoption of PRP, 
the estimated effect on productivity and wages will be biased. To avoid that these 
relationships remain obscured, the issue of endogeneity has to be taken into account. The 
binary nature of our key explanatory variable (PRP) led us to handle endogeneity within 
the context of the treatment effect techniques. As we will discuss below, in two out of the 
three instrumental variable quantile methods used in our estimates, we compared the 
performance of both treated  firms (firms adopting PRP scheme) and the control group 
(firms that have not adopted PRP schemes), whose outcomes permit having a 
counterfactual analysis. The volatility of sales at the firm level, recorded in years before 
2005 (over the period 2002-2004)
 3
 , may be a valid instrument because it is a proxy of 
uncertainty. This variable is expected to randomly affect the sample firms, but at the same 
time also influences the probability that firms introduce PRP schemes as an incentive 
device. Indeed, in the Italian two-tiered bargaining regime, firms may distribute PRP wage 
premiums linked to firm results, at the second level of bargaining. This wage component is 
added to the base wage, set in the first level, and could be zero when firms do not gain 
positive results. Thus, also risk-averse employees will be no reluctant to accept these 
agreements, because these variable pays add on in years of success, but do not cause any 
reduction in the (first level) base pay during unsuccessful years. Employees do not take any 
extra-risks, whereas firms, on their part, especially if they experienced a high degree of 
                                                          
3
 As explained in the previous section, the volatility of sales is not available for all firms, hence the robustness 
checks are performed on a restricted sample. 
11 
 
11 
 
volatility in the past, would be more willing to adopt PRP schemes as a strategy to obtain 
higher employee performance and successful outcomes.  
The literature dealing with the instrumental variable treatment effects of policy 
measures is increasing and different quantile regression estimators are available (see Bosio, 
2009; Frölic and Melly, 2013a, for useful overviews). In our work, we use three different 
methods: i) the traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute Deviation Estimator 
(IVQR_2LAD), of Amemya (1982); ii) the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie, 
Angrist and Imbens (2002) (IVQR_AAI); iii) the IV estimator for Unconditional QR of 
Frölic and Melly (2013b) (IVQR_FFM). These estimators, that allow us to examine the 
impact of PRP throughout labor productivity and wage distribution by tackling 
endogeneity, present different characteristics.  
First of all, the last two methods are based on a binary endogenous variable and a binary 
instrument. Thus, we transformed the past sales volatility of the firm into a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 when the firm experienced a volatility higher than the median 
volatility recorded by the others, and 0 otherwise. The IVQR_2LAD estimator consists in 
using the fitted values, obtained from a first step, in a standard quantile regression, 
performed in a second step, where the instrumented key variable (PRP) is introduced as a 
covariate. In our case, the first step is a probit regression of PRP (our endogenous binary 
variable) on the binary instrument (sales volatility) at the firm level. 
 
(5)  (        |          )   (              ) 
 
where SV is the binary instrument for volatility of sales, X the firm level controls 
mentioned above.  
The fitted value of PRP was then inserted in the standard quantile regressions (4) and 
(5). In order to obtain consistent standard errors, we bootstrapped them in both the first 
stage and the second stage regressions (Arias, 2001; Bosio, 2009).  Notice, however, that 
this approach relies on the symmetry of the composite error obtained in the second stage 
(see Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) show that this 
estimate is not consistent when the quantile treatment effect differs across quantiles and it 
is precisely in that case that the quantile regression method is interesting (see also Melly, 
2004 and Bosio, 2009). For this reason we only keep the IVQR_2LAD estimator as a 
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benchmark and turn to other methods that, although not completely free from other 
problems, reveal more robust. 
The Abadie, Angrist and Imbens conditional quantile treatment effects estimator 
(IVQR_AAI) can be applied only if both endogenous variables and instruments are binary 
variables. Furthermore, the causal effect is identified only for the sub-population of 
compliers. In our case, the compliers are firms whose estimated probability to adopt a PRP 
scheme is correlated to the higher estimated probability of having experienced a past 
volatility of sales above the median. These compliers are, in our sample, about 72% of all 
firms adopting PRP
4
.  
Following Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002), the conditional quantile treatment effect 
for compliers can be estimated consistently by the following weighted quantile regressions: 
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where the weights     
   combine the endogenous variable and the instrument
5
. As stated 
above, the instrument is assumed to hit the sample firms randomly, and the conditional 
probability to have a volatility above the median,   (    |    ) has been estimated by 
means of a non-parametric regression, by using the local logit estimation suggested by 
Frölich and Melly (2013b). 
Finally, according to an unconditional instrumental variable quantile treatment effect, 
such as that of Firpo et al. (2011), all exogenous variables are estimated with the technique 
of Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b). Unlike the conditional quantile regression methods 
explained above, in this case the inclusion of covariates independent from the treatment 
                                                          
4
 The remaining 28% are defiers, i.e. they are those firms with low volatility and that adopted PRP schemes. 
5
 Actually, we estimated a modified version of     
    that allows only positive weights, see Abadie, Angrist and 
Imbens (2002). 
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does not change the limit of the estimated quantile treatment effects; it means that the 
results do not change significantly when the set of covariates changes. Secondly, 
estimators for unconditional quantile treatment effects are entirely non-parametric and do 
not require restrictions such as linearity or other parametric features.  
However, also in the Frölich and Melly approach the causal effect is identified only for 
compliers, according to the following estimator: 
 
(9)   (   
     
 )        ∑    
      (  (
 
 
)
   
           ) 
 
(10)  (   
     
 )        ∑    
      (  (
 
 
)
   
           ) 
 
 
(11)                          
   
         (    |    )
  (    |    ) (    (    |    ))
 (         ) 
 
where    
   are the weights suggested by Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b). This regression 
corresponds to a bivariate quantile regression in which    
  is identified only for PRP=1 
observations, and    
  only for PRP=0 observations. In this case the covariates are inserted 
only in the weights     
  , but not in the second stage equations (9) and (10). In addition, 
these weights simultaneously balance the distribution of the covariates between treated and 
non-treated compliers, whereas     
    do not, because they refer to a conditional model. 
Lastly, also in this case the probability that a firm experienced a volatility of sales above 
the median   (    |    ), has been estimated by means of a non-parametric local logit 
approach. 
 
Estimation results: OLS and standard Quantile estimates 
In this section we present OLS (equations 1 and 2) and standard QR estimates (equations 
3 and 4) for labor productivity and wages. These estimates are obtained by including time, 
sector and regional (NUTS) dummies to control for time- varying, sector-specific factors, as 
well as geographical disparities which likely influence the dependent variables and cannot be 
captured by other controls included in our analysis. 
14 
 
14 
 
Due to multicollinearity problems, we cannot introduce the firm size as regressor. Notice, 
however, that we find a high correlation between export and innovation propensities, on the 
one hand, and firm size on the other, in line with results of other studies on Italian firms (see 
Hall et al. 2009). This evidence led us to consider export and innovation propensities as good 
proxies of the firm size
6
. 
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
The first columns of Table 2 and Table 3 report the labor productivity and wage estimates 
obtained for the whole sample of firms and the remaining columns those for unionized firms. 
OLS findings indicate that the coefficient of PRP is positive and significant and analogous 
results have been obtained by replicating our estimation strategy for unionized firms. This 
means that adopting PRP fosters, on average, both labor productivity and wages.  
The standard QT estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that our key explanatory 
variable shows a positive and significant effect (almost always at the 1% level of 
significance) at all quantiles. However, the differences in coefficients associated with PRP 
across the labor productivity and wage distributions signal that heterogeneity matters. The 
OLS and median regression coefficients (=0.5) for labor productivity are very similar (9.4% 
and 9.6%, respectively). Analogously, similar coefficients are found for wage estimates 
(11.8% and 10.9%, for OLS and median coefficients, respectively). However, these results 
change remarkably at the tails of the distribution. In particular, we obtain that PRP has a 
much greater positive impact at the lower conditional quantile (=0.1) of both labor 
productivity and wage distributions. These differences are confirmed also for the sample of 
unionized firms, highlighting that PRP schemes are particularly significant for enterprises 
facing difficulties in terms of efficiency, independently from the presence or not of unions. 
From the specification adopted for OLS and standard QR, most of the control variables 
show the expected sign. First, we find the significant and positive role of the capital stock per 
capita in labor productivity and wage equations. Second, concerning workforce 
characteristics, we obtain the negative coefficient of fixed-term workers on labor 
productivity, accompanied by a parallel penalization of these precarious workers in terms of 
wages (see Table 3). The QR analysis reveals some evidence of heterogeneity also for this 
                                                          
6
 The results concerning these correlations, found in our sample, are available upon request. 
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variable, with negative and significant coefficients of fixed-term workers along the whole 
productivity and wage distributions, but with a magnitude, in absolute value, that decreases at 
higher conditional quantiles. The higher coefficient for the lower tail of the distribution 
suggests that, especially in low performer firms that use temporary contracts as a cost cut 
strategy, these forms of job instability reduces investment in training and workers’ 
motivations and, in the end, deteriorate productivity prospects (Blanchard and Landier 2002). 
In best performer firms, on the contrary, temporary contracts may also represent a screening 
device to select new employees. Thus, these arrangements may induce motivation and effort 
from those workers who, after the probation period, are interested in obtaining permanent 
positions, with the result that this incentive effect partially counterbalances the negative 
impact due to uncertainty and job instability. 
Other workers’ characteristics, such as employment positions, play a role. The coefficient 
associated with white- and blue-collar workers, with respect to the omitted category, the 
executives, are negative and significant, mainly at the highest conditional quantile. A 
plausible interpretation is that managerial employees have a positive and significant 
influence on productivity, especially in better performing firms. Among other factors, this 
may be due to their providing better-designed pay schemes to induce optimal effort from 
their subordinates. 
Another interesting finding is the strong negative coefficient associated with the 
percentage of women, across the whole productivity and wage distribution. A cautionary 
interpretation is necessary, since the percentage of women is very likely to be correlated with 
unobserved (or omitted) firm characteristics. In addition, the negative coefficients associated 
with the female component are likely to be related to the gender wage gap. Our wage 
estimates seem to confirm that lower productivity increases, obtained when the proportion of 
women is higher, is at least partially related to less generous remunerations offered to 
women. This is in line with other studies that find that female employees, on average, prefer 
activities that allow a larger flexibility between job and family, have lower interdependence 
with other workers, are less involved in participative work forms (Zwick, 2004), and appear 
less respondent to incentives.  
For firm characteristics related to internationalization, our results indicate that the 
coefficients associated with the propensity to export are positive and significant, but lower at 
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the highest quantiles and for the subsample of unionized firms. This provides evidence that 
productivity gains of exporters are more important for firms at the lower tail of the efficiency 
and wage distribution, probably because, under international competition, especially low 
performer firms are induced to catching up processes.  
The control for multinational enterprises (MNEs), on the contrary, plays a significant role 
only at the 90
th
 percentile, but is not significant across all quantiles in unionized firms. As 
discussed above, these international variables are highly correlated with the firm’s size and 
thus, indirectly provide a control for the firms’ size. 
 
Estimation results: instrumental variable quantile regressions 
 
The possible endogeneity of PRP deserves further attention. The exogeneity assumption 
of PRP might be violated if firms adopt this reward system on the basis of productivity 
performance. In other terms, enterprises with PRP might have already been more efficient 
(and may have offered higher rewards) than firms that do not have a scheme, before its 
adoption. This problem, due to the fact that better managed firms tend to adopt PRP, is taken 
into account by carrying out instrumental variable estimates. 
As discussed above, in the section dedicated to the econometric strategy, we attempted to 
recover the random assignment of PRP (that is our treatment variable) by means of another 
binary variable such as past sales volatility. The volatility of sales at the firm level, recorded 
in the years before 2005 (2002-2004) is a proxy of uncertainty faced by firms, and it is not 
expected to be correlated with current values of labor productivity and wages, but correlated 
with the probability that firms introduce PRP schemes as incentive devices
7
. 
The results, obtained by using different estimators and using the past values of volatility of 
sales at firm level as instrument, are shown in Table 4. It must be recalled that this 
instrumental variable was not available for all the firms we considered in the standard QR (see 
                                                          
7
 Besides the reasons discussed in the previous section, it must be remarked that among the rationales 
behind the choice of our instrument, one may recall some results of the strategic management and sales 
management literatures. For instance, the use of an incentive plan is positively related to a dimension of 
organizational performance, such as sales volatility, as found by Menguc and Barkers (2003). Other 
arguments related to the correlation between variable pay and profit volatility are offered by Burke and 
Hsieh (2006). 
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Tables 2 and 3), hence the number of observations considerably reduces and performing 
estimates for a more restricted sample of firms represents an additional robustness check.  
In order to make the comparison of different approaches readable, we report outcomes 
uniformed to IVQR_FM estimates that do not include control variables in the second stage. 
Thus, Table 4 reports only coefficients and standard errors for our variable of interest, PRP
8
. 
As done with previous estimates, for each dependent variable we ran two specifications, the 
first for the whole sample and the second for the unionized firms.  
 [Insert Table 4] 
Columns a, b and c of Table 4 show the results of the traditional IVQR_2LAD of Amemya 
(1982) and basically confirm a positive and significant impact of PRP along all distributions 
of both labor productivity and wages. As explained above, this estimator could not be 
consistent if the composite error is asymmetric (Wooldridge, 2010); in any case, it can be a 
useful benchmark because it allows the relationship between the instrument (volatility of 
sales) and the endogenous variable (PRP) to be observed directly in the first stage, as we 
formalized in equation 5.  The results of the probit regression, shown in the appendix (Table 
A.2), highlight that high sales volatility (SV=1) positively influences the probability to adopt a 
PRP scheme, as we hypothesized above. 
Columns d, e and f of Table 4 show the PRP coefficients estimated with the instrumental 
variable conditional quantile treatment effect of Abadie et al. (2002). These results confirm 
those of standard QR (Tables 2 and 3) in terms of positive and heterogeneous coefficients 
associated to PRP along productivity and wage distributions. It is worth noting that, like 
standard QR, the PRP scheme shows a greater impact on low performers (firms at the bottom 
of the productivity and wage distributions) in three out of four specifications (the only 
exception is labor productivity for all firms, reported in the first rows). According to the 
literature (Wooldridge, 2010; Frölich and Melly, 2010; 2013b), the IVQR_AAI estimator is 
much more reliable than the IVQR_2LAD one, even though the causal relationship between 
PRP and dependent variables is identified only for compliers, namely firms with high sale 
volatility (SV=1) that adopt PRP (about 72% of total firms adopting PRP, in our case). 
Probably the characteristics of this method, applied to more restricted sample, justify the 
                                                          
8
 For both IVQR_2LAD and IVQR_AAI estimations, the control variables maintained the same sign 
reported in tables 2 and 3, even though the significance level slightly reduces. These results are available 
upon request. 
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differences with respect to the standard QR results. Indeed in all IVQR_AAI estimates, we 
found a ‘U shaped’ relationship between PRP and dependent variables (the magnitude of 
coefficients decreases, moving from the lowest quantile to the median quantile, and increases 
again at the 90
th
 quantile). 
The instrumental variable unconditional quantile regression of Frölich and Melly (2010; 
2013b) is reported in the last 3 columns of Table 4. These results basically confirm those 
obtained with the IVQR_AAI approach, thus PRP coefficients are always positive and 
significant, but also show a “U shaped” behavior in moving from the bottom to the upper tail 
of both productivity and wage distributions. This means that PRP exerts greater positive 
influence for companies lagging behind in terms of productivity and wages. The different 
interpretation that unconditional quantile regression needs (Frölich and Melly, 2010, p.429), 
also in this case justifies the differences in the magnitude of coefficients.  
On the whole, the results of Table 4 deserve further attention in terms of distributive 
implications. First, the comparison of the coefficients of PRP on labor productivity and wages 
unambiguously shows that the impacts on remunerations are lower than those recorded for 
labor productivity. Indeed, at least in our sample period, PRP schemes contributed to 
temperate unit labor costs because the workers did not fully appropriate productivity gains.  
Second, the role of unions, far from reversing these general patterns, amplify the positive gap 
between labor efficiency and wages, since workers’ representatives do not exert their 
bargaining power to obtain additional premiums above-productivity gains. This finding is 
clearly observable in Figure 2, where the effects of PRP on labor productivity and wage 
distributions have been calculated with the instrumental variable unconditional quantile 
regression of Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b) for all deciles (from 0.10 to 0.90). This result 
is a confirmation that in the years of progressive decline in trade union membership and 
diffusion of precarious working conditions, the objective function of unions has been more 
oriented to wage moderation to preserve job positions. Thus, employees’ representatives have 
exerted their bargaining power to moderate wage demands, as also shown for other country 
experiences (Dumont et al. 2005).  
Finally, notice that all these estimates are obtained with specifications that control for firm 
characteristics (capital accumulation, firm innovation strategies, internationalization, merger 
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policies), occupation characteristics (employment positions, typology of contracts, gender 
characteristics), macro-region and industry dummies. 
Summing up, the quantile treatment effects estimates obtained with different estimators 
confirm and complement the previous findings reported in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The major finding of our study is that performance-related pay (PRP) may significantly 
stimulate efficiency gains and thus the limited implementation of these wage practices has 
played a role in explaining the disappointing Italian results. Concerning distributive aspects, 
we estimated the role of these agreements on wages to ascertain whether employees benefit 
financially from PRP, an issue that deserves attention because the existing empirical evidence 
is still insufficient to infer definite results. From the comparison of productivity and wage 
estimates, we obtained information indicating that PRP might not only be rent-sharing 
devices, but also incentive schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These 
findings, obtained for a large sample of manufacturing and service firms in which we 
controlled for a complete set of covariates, provide useful insights for the Italian economy, 
whereas prior works for this country have been restricted to large companies, selected sectors 
or particular areas of the country. 
We also considered another debated issue concerning the quality of industrial relations, 
represented by the presence of unions, whose importance, according to international evidence, 
is still ambiguous. In fact, their presence may minimize free-riding and promote collaborative 
attitudes, but their attitudes, in favor of (or adverse to) PRP schemes, remain ambiguous, and 
empirically there is no clear evidence whether unions increase or decrease incentive effects of 
PRP agreements, as reviewed in Hirsch (2007). 
For Italian enterprises, we conclude that unions not only extract wage premiums for their 
workers, as predicted by monopoly union bargaining models, but through their ‘voice’ 
function, may counter-balance negative side-effects of collective PRP, such as free-riding. 
Overall, the estimates suggest that workers’ organizations play a redistributive function that is 
not detrimental to an efficiency- enhancing role. All these findings were supported by a 
number of robustness checks, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms along the 
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productivity and wage distributions by means of quantile regressions. We found significant 
differences and the highest incidence of PRP on productivity and wages at low and high 
quantiles of their distribution, also including corrections for biases due to endogeneity of PRP. 
Concerning policy implications, we suggest that the adoption of measures that circumvent the 
limited implementation of PRP practices should be implemented, since payments by results, 
rather than being only distributive devices, may substantially lead to efficiency enhancements, 
and the effectiveness of this strategy is not weakened under union governance. 
Future research will allow us to more thoroughly explore firms’ heterogeneity. Additional 
statistical information will permit us to explore the role of individual and collective variable 
payment schemes on the basis of an even more complete dataset and to thoroughly evaluate 
their different influence on efficiency gains and redistribution inside heterogeneous Italian 
firms. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: RIL-AIDA  
 Year 2005 Year 2007 Year 2010 
 
N. 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
N. 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev
. 
N. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Performance Related Pay 8064 0.15 0.35 8362 0.12 0.31 10136 0.14 0.33 
Accounting variables (constant prices, 
reference year 2005)          
ln (value added per capita) 5291 10.66 0.77 7512 10.73 0.62 9069 10.69 0.61 
ln (wage per capita) 5241 9.93 0.66 7451 9.99 0.42 9060 10.01 0.43 
ln (physical capital per capita) 5294 9.80 1.60 7507 9.85 1.58 9054 9.90 1.76 
Workforce characteristics 
         
Executives 8064 0.09 0.13 8551 0.05 0.1 10136 0.05 0.1 
White collar workers 8064 0.45 0.32 8551 0.38 0.31 10136 0.39 0.31 
Blue-collar workers 8064 0.46 0.32 8551 0.57 0.33 10136 0.55 0.33 
Women 8064 0.39 0.28 8580 0.34 0.28 10136 0.35 0.28 
Fixed-term contracts 8064 0.11 0.16 8580 0.10 0.17 10136 0.10 0.17 
Immigrant workers 8064 0.09 0.18 8301 0.06 0.12 9955 0.05 0.11 
Firm characteristics (binary variables) 
         
Process Innovation 7775 0.47 0.50 8169 0.43 0.50 9920 0.39 0.49 
Product Innovation 7820 0.55 0.50 8184 0.56 0.50 9926 0.45 0.50 
Export 8064 0.41 0.49 8360 0.30 0.39 9944 0.31 0.46 
MNEs 8429 0.03 0.48 8328 0.032 0.18 9955 0.039 0.19 
M&As 8421 0.02 0.14 8348 0.016 0.13 9947 0.049 0.22 
High Sales volatility_2002-2004 2887 0.50 0.50 3600 0.49 0.50 2416 0.51 0.50 
Firm Size 
  
 
  
 
  
 
5 <  n of employees<15 8064 0.38 0.49 8551 0.42 0.50 10136 0.43 0.50 
15 ≦n employees < 50 8064 0.35 0.48 8551 0.34 0.48 10136 0.33 0.47 
50 ≦ n employees < 250 8064 0.21 0.41 8551 0.19 0.39 10136 0.19 0.39 
n of employees ≧250 8064 0.07 0.22 8551 0.05 0.17 10136 0.05 0.18 
NUTS1_Macro-regions 
  
 
  
 
  
 
North- West 8064 0.35 0.47 8580 0.34 0.47 10136 0.33 0.47 
North-East 8064 0.25 0.43 8580 0.26 0.44 10136 0.25 0.43 
Centre 8064 0.2 0.40 8580 0.2 0.40 10136 0.21 0.41 
South 8064 0.21 0.41 8580 0.21 0.41 10136 0.21 0.41 
Sectors 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Textile, Wearing Apparel, Food Industry 8064 0.14 0.34 8580 0.14 0.35 10136 0.14 0.33 
Other Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities 8064 0.28 0.45 8580 0.31 0.46 10136 0.31 0.46 
Constructions 8064 0.11 0.32 8580 0.1 0.31 10136 0.1 0.35 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 8064 0.13 0.34 8580 0.16 0.36 10136 0.16 0.34 
Transportation and communication 8064 0.07 0.26 8580 0.05 0.21 10136 0.05 0.26 
Intermediation and other business service 8064 0.14 0.34 8580 0.1 0.30 10136 0.1 0.34 
Education, health and private social services 8064 0.12 0.33 8580 0.14 0.35 10136 0.14 0.29 
Notes: for binary variables and dummies the mean corresponds to the relative frequency. 
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Figure 1. Distributions of Wages, Labor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity  
Labor Productivity (All Firms) Labor Productivity (Unionized Firms) 
  
Wages (All Firms) Wages (Unionized Firms) 
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Table 2. OLS and Quantile Regressions: effects of PRP on Labor Productivity 
 All Firms Unionized Firms 
Dependent Variable Ln(Value Added per capita) 
 
OLS Standard QR OLS Standard QR 
 a b c d e f g h 
Covariates 
 
θ =.10 θ = 50 θ = 90  θ =.10 θ = 50 θ = 90 
Performance Related Pay (PRP) 0.094*** 0.136*** 0.096*** 0.044*   0.106*** 0.183*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.014) (0.023) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.140*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.158*** 0.125*** 0.112*** 0.100*** 0.120*** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.456*** -0.607*** -0.403*** -0.211*** -0.369*** -0.369*** -0.216*** -0.291*** 
 
(0.030) (0.052) (0.025) (0.042) (0.076) (0.102) (0.062) (0.100) 
Executives_share 0.757*** -0.117 0.923*** 1.791*** 1.356*** 0.487*** 1.897*** 2.477*** 
 
(0.065) (0.082) (0.077) (0.138) (0.158) (0.128) (0.154) (0.227) 
White Collars_share 0.340*** 0.272*** 0.336*** 0.493*** 0.304*** 0.145**  0.324*** 0.476*** 
 
(0.017) (0.026) (0.015) (0.029) (0.035) (0.059) (0.033) (0.053) 
Women_share -0.395*** -0.502*** -0.426*** -0.301*** -0.463*** -0.399*** -0.505*** -0.449*** 
 
(0.020) (0.032) (0.015) (0.034) (0.042) (0.069) (0.029) (0.055) 
Process Innovation 0.011 0.050*** 0.015*   -0.019 0.01 0.044 0.019 -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) (0.026) 
Product Innovation 0.003 0.044*** 0.007 -0.053*** 0.005 0.009 -0.004 -0.016 
 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.014) (0.028) 
MNEs 0.055*** -0.037 0.033*   0.111*** 0.014 -0.003 -0.005 0.011 
  (0.019) (0.035) (0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.064) (0.031) (0.041) 
Exporters 0.065*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.039**  0.050** 0.067*   0.034**  0.046*   
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.008) (0.016) (0.021) (0.039) (0.015) (0.026) 
M&As 0.028 -0.007 0.011 0.035 0.064* 0.03 0.061**  0.208*** 
 
(0.025) (0.042) (0.018) (0.052) (0.036) (0.057) (0.028) (0.081) 
Constant 9.228*** 8.955*** 9.525*** 9.624*** 9.372*** 8.893*** 9.702*** 9.930*** 
 
(0.039) (0.064) (0.033) (0.062) (0.078) (0.144) (0.062) (0.088) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.259 0.173 0.172 0.181 0.269 0.183 0.194 0.203 
Obs. 19183 
 
19183 
 
4718 4718 
Notes: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; 
** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
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Table 3. OLS and Quantile Regressions: effects of PRP on Wages 
 All Firms Unionized Firms 
Dependent Variable Ln(Wage) 
 
OLS Standard QR OLS Standard QR 
 a b c d e f g h 
Covariates 
 
 =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90   =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90 
Performance Related Pay (PRP) 0.118*** 0.185*** 0.109*** 0.055*** 0.073*** 0.119*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.008) (0.014) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.486*** -0.676*** -0.423*** -0.133*** -0.447*** -0.488*** -0.318*** -0.184**  
 
(0.027) (0.046) (0.021) (0.037) (0.063) (0.092) (0.046) (0.075) 
Executives_share 0.630*** -0.291*** 0.957*** 1.656*** 1.205*** 0.610*** 1.646*** 2.006*** 
 
(0.056) (0.088) (0.054) (0.077) (0.122) (0.155) (0.098) (0.140) 
White Collars_share 0.260*** 0.301*** 0.249*** 0.293*** 0.259*** 0.253*** 0.264*** 0.335*** 
 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.027) (0.041) (0.022) (0.036) 
Women_share -0.374*** -0.453*** -0.392*** -0.338*** -0.376*** -0.462*** -0.421*** -0.357*** 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.030) (0.050) (0.021) (0.033) 
Process Innovation -0.01 0.004 -0.003 -0.032*** -0.024* -0.022 -0.01 -0.045*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016) 
Product Innovation 0.009 0.035*** 0.004 -0.020*   0.005 0.028 0.000 -0.016 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.010) (0.017) 
MNEs 0.062*** 0.009 0.039*** 0.124*** 0.000 0.077**  -0.002 -0.013 
  (0.016) (0.033) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.013) (0.021) 
Exporters 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.049*** 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.025*   
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) 
M&As 0.047** 0.035 0.045*** 0.013 0.055** 0.031 0.043*** 0.043 
 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.010) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.013) (0.029) 
Constant 9.300*** 8.825*** 9.594*** 9.894*** 9.365*** 8.831*** 9.694*** 10.029*** 
 
(0.031) (0.058) (0.021) (0.037) (0.061) (0.113) (0.037) (0.066) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.237 0.204 0.17 0.17 0.274 0.249 0.208 0.205 
Obs. 19217 19217 4699 4699 
Note: Robust (OLS) and bootstrap (Quantile Regression) standard errors in parentheses. .*** significant at .01 level; 
** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
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Table 4. Effects of PRP on Labor Productivity, Wages and TFP, according to Instrumental Variable 
Quantile Regression methods 
  All Firms _ Dependent Variable: Ln(Value Added per capita) 
  IVQR_2LAD    IVQR_AAI IVQR_FM 
 a b c d e f g h i 
   =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90 
PRP_Coefficient 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.279*** 0.560*** 0.386*** 0.581*** 0.815*** 0.482*** 0.766*** 
Standard Errors (0.031) (0.018) (0.042) (0.088) (0.056) (0.112) (0.214) (0.101) (0.196) 
Obs 7600 7600 7600 7555 7555 7555 7555 7555 7555 
Pseudo_R_2 0.144 0.155 0.199       
  Unionized Firms _ Dependent Variable: Ln(Value Added per capita)  
  IVQR_2LAD    IVQR_AAI IVQR_FM 
 a b c d e f g h i 
   =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90 
PRP_Coefficient 0.309*** 0.332*** 0.279*** 0.622*** 0.389*** 0.539*** 0.897*** 0.542*** 0.787*** 
Standard Errors (0.085) (0.037) (0.081) (0.199) (0.104) (0.156) (0.287) (0.149) (0.243) 
Obs 2698 2698 2698 2689 2689 2689 2689 2689 2689 
Pseudo_R_2 0.173 0.182 0.192       
  All Firms _ Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage)  
  IVQR_2LAD    IVQR_AAI IVQR_FM 
 a b c d e f g h i 
   =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90 
PRP_Coefficient 0.152*** 0.132*** 0.143*** 0.421*** 0.255*** 0.306*** 0.740*** 0.375*** 0.448*** 
Standard Errors (0.022) (0.011) (0.022) (0.087) (0.040) (0.079) (0.187) (0.075) (0.132) 
Obs 7600 7600 7600 7547 7547 7547 7547 7547 7547 
Pseudo_R_2 0.178 0.169 0.190       
  Unionized Firms _ Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) 
  IVQR_2LAD    IVQR_AAI IVQR_FM 
 a b c d e f g h i 
   =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90  =0.10  = 0.50  = 0.90 
PRP_Coefficient 0.160*** 0.172*** 0.235*** 0.386** 0.165*** 0.193** 0.719*** 0.311*** 0.399*** 
Standard Errors (0.052) (0.024) (0.048) (0.152) (0.059) (0.086) (0.322) (0.105) (0.162) 
Obs 2698 2698 2698 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 2677 
Pseudo_R_2 0.206 0.185 0.202       
Note: IVQR_2LAD=Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression performed with a Two Stage Least Absolute 
Deviation Estimator (Amemya, 1982), in the first stage (see table A.2) the endogenous variable (PRP) is regressed on 
a dummy variable (instrument) controlling for high/low volatility of the firm sales over the period 2002-2004; 
IVQR_AAI= Conditional Quantile Treatment Effect with the Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) estimator, the 
instrument is the dummy for firm sale volatility; IVQR_FM=Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effect according to 
the Frolich and Melly (2010) estimator, the instrument is the firm sale volatility. All regressions have been run with 
the same control variables that have been shown in tables 2 and 3.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 
level; *significant at .10 level. 
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Figure 2. Effects of Performance Related Pay on Labor Productivity and Wage distributions according to the Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator 
for Endogenous Variables (Frolich and Melly, 2010) 
All Firms Unionized Firms 
  
Note: the plots of PRP coefficients refer to all deciles of labor productivity and wage distributions (from the 1th to the 9th). All these coefficients are significant at 1% or 5% level. More 
detailed information concerning these estimations are available upon request.
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APPENDIX 
 Table A1. Variable definition  
Source: RIL Survey, ISFOL  
 Variable Definition 
Performance Related Pay 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts 
PRP payments of any kind, 0 otherwise. 
ln (value added per capita) 
Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the value added deflator (source ISTAT) 
ln (wage per capita) 
Log of wage bill per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the consumer price index for blue and 
white collar workers (source ISTAT) 
ln (physical capital per 
capita) 
Log of capital stock per employee (source AIDA) 
deflated by the investment deflator (source ISTAT) 
Executives Percentage of managers and supervisors 
White collar workers Percentage of white collar workers 
Blue-collar workers Percentage of manual workers  
Women Percentage of women among total workers 
Fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term workers 
Immigrant workers Percentage of workers coming from other countries 
Unions 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a worker 
representation of any kind in the firm, 0 otherwise 
Age Age of firms 
Process Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted 
process innovations in the 3 previous years, 0 
otherwise 
Product Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm originated 
new products in the 3 previous years, 0 otherwise 
MNEs 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is foreign 
owned, 0 otherwise 
Exporters 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported 
in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
M&As 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
experienced a merger or acquisition in the 3 
previous years, 0 otherwise 
High Sales Volatility 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the standard 
deviation of the 2002-2004 sales is higher than the 
median standard deviation of the sample, and 0 
otherwise. 
Firm Size   Logarithm of the number of employees at firm level 
North- West 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
localized in North-Western regions, 0 otherwise 
North-East 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
localized in North-Eastern regions, 0 otherwise 
Centre 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
localized in Central regions, 0 otherwise 
South 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
localized in Southern regions, 0 otherwise 
Sectors 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
localized in sector shown in table1, 0 otherwise 
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Table A2. Sales Volatility as determinant of PRP_First Stage Probit Regression of IVQR_2LAD 
Regression  
Dependent Variable Performance Related Pay (PRP) 
 All Firms Unionized Firms 
Covariates 
 
 
High Sales Volatility (1/0) 0.571*** 0.429*** 
 
(0.042) (0.053) 
ln (physical capital per capita) 0.023* 0.028 
 
(0.012) (0.023) 
Fixed-term contracts_Share -0.287** 0.117 
 
(0.139) (0.250) 
Executives_share 0.458** 0.964** 
 
(0.193) (0.382) 
White Collars_share -0.379*** -0.144 
 
(0.083) (0.121) 
Women_share -0.623*** -0.680*** 
 
(0.086) (0.113) 
Process Innovation 0.175*** 0.144** 
 
(0.043) (0.068) 
Product Innovation 0.106** 0.180*** 
 
(0.045) (0.056) 
MNEs 0.200*** 0.099 
  (0.068) (0.077) 
Exporters 0.171*** 0.132 
  (0.043) (0.084) 
M&As 0.099 0.027 
 
(0.110) (0.122) 
Constant -1.357*** -0.813*** 
 
(0.144) (0.312) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Sector Dummies yes yes 
NUTS1_level Dummies yes yes 
PseudoR_2 0.115 0.104 
Obs. 7600 2698 
Notes: The instrument of PRP is a binary variable indicating high sales volatility at the firm level. If standard deviation of the 2002-2004 
sales is higher than the median standard deviation of the sample the binary variable equals 1, otherwise it is 0. Bootstrap standard errors 
in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. 
 
 
